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Forthcoming HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & GENDER

REMEDYING SYSTEMIC SEX DISCRIMINATION
BY GENDER QUOTAS: JUST BECAUSE
Tracy A. Thomas*
When newly-elected Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was asked by surprised
reporters why he appointed women as fifty percent of his new cabinet, he responded simply,
“Because it’s 2015.”1 Just because. Because it’s time. In fact, he suggested, it is long past time
for having to justify including women as one-half of the power structure when women constitute
one-half of the population. And it’s time for meaningful change in shared governance by
something as pragmatically simple as selecting fifteen women and fifteen men for
appointments.2
Similarly, it is long past time for justifying the need to reform American institutions that
exclude women from the power structure. Rather than stumbling along the path of continued sex
discrimination by the ineffective application of judicial band-aids to systemic problems, it is time
for alteration of the power structure itself. It’s time for the law to endorse the equal
representation of women in all power venues in order to remedy—permanently—longstanding
and resistant, systemic sex discrimination.3 And the way to get there might be quotas.

*

Associate Dean for Institutional Excellence, Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law, The University of Akron
School of Law.
1
Elliott Hannon, Canada’s New Prime Minister Says He Picked a Cabinet That’s Half Women “Because It’s 2015,”
SLATE, Nov. 4, 2015, at
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/11/04/canada_s_justin_trudeau_s_gender_equal_cabinet_because_it_s
_2015.html; Natasha Young, This World Leader Has the Perfect Response to Why Feminism Matters, Jan. 25, 2016,
http://www.refinery29.com/2016/01/101912/canada-prime-minister-says-everyone-should-be-a-feminist.
2
Trudeau explained, “I personally convinced a number of extraordinary women to step forward, as well as a number
of extraordinary men, at a time when politics can be very very divisive.” Jill Treanor & Graeme Wearden, Embrace
Feminism to Improve Decision-Making, Trudeau Says, GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2016,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/embrace-feminism-to-improve-decision-making-says-justin-trudeau
3
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now More Than Ever, 37 HARVARD J.
LAW & GENDER 569 (2014); MARTHA CHAMMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER AND TORT LAW (2010).

“Quota” is a dirty word. In U.S law and society, we are “quota-phobic,” vehemently
resisting an idea alleged to be based on political correctness in place of merit.4 Quotas have been
used in affirmative-action remedies to integrate schools racially in proportion to the community
or to mandate a set percentage of government contractors of minority status.5 And quotas have
been overturned by the Supreme Court as discriminatory in and of themselves.6 However,
quotas are much more accepted in other countries, particularly Europe, where gender quotas for
corporate boards, political representatives, and academic review boards are increasingly
commonplace.7 “In many jurisdictions around the world, women's past and current disadvantage
is regarded as an injustice that must be corrected by various measures, including
antidiscrimination law, affirmative action, and even gender quotas.”8 It is thus worth
reconsidering gender quotas as a potential remedy in America.
Quotas offer the power to change the big picture of systemic discrimination. For at the
broad level, sex discrimination is still apparent. Women constitute 50.8% of the American
population.9 Yet, women are 47% of law students, but 34% of lawyers, 18% of equity partners,
25% of judges, 20% of law deans, and 25% of lawmakers.10 Women earn 57% of all bachelor’s

4

See Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2873, 2884 (2008).
5
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
6
Parents Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7
Julie C. Suk, Gender Quotas After the End of Men, 93 B.U.L. Rev. 1123 (2013).
8
Id. at 1124.
9
U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, July 1, 2014.
10
ABA Commission on Women, Statistics, A Current Glance at Women in the Law (July 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_statistics_july2014.authcheckdam.p
df; Lauren Stiller Rickleen, Women Partners Continue to Lag Behind Male Colleagues, National Association of
Women Lawyers Annual Survey Report (2015),
file:///C:/Users/thomast/Downloads/NAWL%202015%20SURVEY_FINAL.pdf; Women in State Legislatures for
2015, http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislators/womens-legislative-network/women-in-state-legislatures-for2015.aspx; Women in U.S. Congress 2015 (20%), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2015; see also
Amber Phillips, The Sad State of Black Women in State Political Office, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/05/the-sad-state-of-black-women-in-statewide-politicaloffice/ (reporting that black women are 7.4% of the population, but 3.5% of the legislators and 1% of mayors).
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degrees, 50% of science degrees, but are only 25% of the STEM workforce.11 And women are
47% of the workforce, 55% of business consumers, 40% of MBAs, 40% of business managers,
but less than 20% of corporate boards and 15% of Chief Executive Officers.12 The courts
receive continued filings of sex discrimination complaints, not due to facially-discriminatory
rules like nineteenth-century coverture, but due to practices and informal norms of exclusion and
denial of opportunity just the same.13 Laws directed at malevolent individual bad actors miss the
picture, and fail to redress the more complex and embedded systemic bias, structural
impediments, and gendered norms that continue to fuel gender inequality.14 Discriminatory
harms of gender inequality in employment, education, marriage, religion, pregnancy, and
profession have existed since the founding of our country, and women’s demands for eradication
of such wrongs since the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments have not yet been realized.15 Two
hundred years of harm, and more than fifty years of modern feminist legal reform are more than
enough to dispel the notion that the status quo is sufficient or that more basic measures should
first be tried.
It’s time to consider more effective, systemic, and long-lasting remedies of gender
quotas. A quota remedy would require gender parity—proportional representation of women in
positions of power. The proportion would match the gender distribution of the general

State of Girls and Women in STEM, Nat’l Girls Collaborative Project, https://ngcproject.org/statistics.
Women in the Professional Workforce, Feb. 2015, http://dpeaflcio.org/professionals/professionals-in-theworkplace/women-in-the-professional-and-technical-labor-force; Marcus Noland & Tyler Moran, Study: Firms With
More Women in the C-Suite are More Profitable, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 8, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/02/studyfirms-with-more-women-in-the-c-suite-are-more-profitable; Kitty Lindsay, Coca-Cola CEO Touts Feminist
Business Model as Secret to Success, MS. BLOG, Dec. 3, 2015 (noting that women comprise 70 percent of Coke
drinkers, but only two board members and fewer than 20 senior leadership positions at the corporation)
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2015/12/03/coca-cola-ceo-touts-feminist-business-model-as-secret-to-success/.
13
E.g., Young v. United Parcel Service, 575 US _ (2015): Bolton v. Lynch, No. 2:15-CV-294 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 21,
2015).
14
Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United States, 26 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 38, 39 (2014); MacKinnon, supra; CHAMMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra.
15
Declaration of Sentiments, in Proceedings of the First Convention on Woman’s Rights, Seneca Falls, New York,
July 14 & 15, 1848.
11
12
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population; so women as about 51% of the population should constitute 51% of the managers,
boards, CEOs, legislatures, and law firm partners, as well as STEM majors and law students.
Judges too, would then be 51% women, although Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested she
would not stop there, opining that the Supreme Court would have the right number of women
justices “When there are nine.”16 This idea of substantial proportionality is seen in the law in the
Title IX education context where one sex is deemed underrepresented if there is a disparity
between the gender composition of the institution’s study body and the gender composition of its
athletics.17 This mandate of parity and proportional representation is exists legally as a tenet of
gender equality. One way to enforce such parity is through quotas, requiring a parallel
representation between population and power.
The idea of gender quotas seems farfetched at first blush. Culturally, it evokes claims of
unfairness, triggering fears of unqualified candidates and reverse discrimination.18 (Though such
fear itself reveals a deep gender bias in assuming women collectively would be unqualified).19
There is also a concern about their counter-effect, for example, limiting women to 51% of
college admissions even though their grades should place them at a much higher percent over
men.20 Legally, the current Supreme Court seems to have foreclosed quotas, at least in the racial

16

SALLY KENNEY, GENDER & JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER (2012); When Will There
Be Enough Women on the Supreme Court? Justice Ginsburg Answers That Question, PBS NewsHour, Feb. 5, 2015,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/will-enough-women-supreme-court-justice-ginsburg-answers-question/; Debra
Cassens Weiss, Justice Ginsburg Says Nine Women on the Supreme Court Would be Enough, ABA J., Oct. 27,
2010.
17
Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Rosenblum, supra, at 2883-84; Deborah Brake, The
Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and The Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 13 (2000).
18
Peta Spender, Gender Quotas on Boards—Is It Time for Australia to Lean In?, 20 DEAKIN L. REV. 95, 101 (2015);
Ruth Sullivan, Can Gender Quotas Get More Women in the Boardroom?, July 1, 2015, www.bloomberg.com;
Susan Smith Blakely, Boosting Diversity Through Quotas—Is This a Good Idea for Women Lawyers?, Ms. JD Blog,
Apr. 20, 2015, http://ms-jd.org/blog/article/boosting-diversity-through-quotas-is-this-a-good-idea-for-womenlawyers?utm_content=buffer39b8c&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer;
19
For a humorous take on such gendered assumptions, see Twitter @manwhohasitall, Nov. 8, 2015 (“I have
absolutely nothing against male bank managers, as long as they have some grasp of financial matters.”).
20
Suk, supra, 1134-39 (discussing the Swedish example of college admissions).
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context.21 However, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from the Court’s racial affirmative
action cases, distinguished the use of race in a “color conscious” way “to prevent discrimination
being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.”22 She cited contemporary
human rights documents, including international treaties against gender discrimination, as laws
that “draw just this line” and “distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed
to accelerate de facto equality.”23
The quota idea might not be so crazy, however, when examined from a perspective of the
law of Remedies. This law requires a meaningful remedy for every harm, and provides the
flexibility necessary to achieve tangible change.24 As discussed in Part I, existing individualized
remedies have been inadequate to redress the entrenched problems of systemic gender
discrimination.25 Institutional and structural problems of inequality have not responded to the
innocuous band-aids of damages and reinstatement, even if plaintiffs make it through the
gauntlet of limitations on class actions and collective relief and laws that fail to encapsulate
gendered harms.26 Second, as discussed in Part II, legal systems in other countries have
recognized this entrenched ineffectiveness and have moved on to mandating quotas for
meaningful and accelerated change.27 This precedent provides support for remedial options that

21

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
23
Id. at 302; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Article 4 of CEDAW, the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, explicitly states that
“temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be
considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention.” 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1981).
24
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of
Due Process: The Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975 (2006); Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi
Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004).
25
See infra.
26
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) (denying class action certification for national class of
women employees claiming sex discrimination in employment).
27
See infra.
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force institutional change in conformance with the legal mandates of gender equality. Part III
then argues that quotas are legally viable under the remedial law of prophylaxis and withstand
judicial constitutional scrutiny.28 It is worth consideration of these judicial options in order to
provide new approaches to old problems. Because it’s time.

I.

The Problem: Continued Harms and Inadequate Remedies
The foundational premise detailed by feminist scholars is that individualized remedies

fail to sufficiently address systemic causes and effects of sex discrimination.29 Examples of the
continuing system harms as seen in the daily news, where sexist systems operate in a microcosm,
and legal slaps fail to make any difference. For example, executive Ellen Pao encountered the
old boys club of Silicon Valley with its gendered assumptions about women, viewing female
colleagues as potential sexual conquests, with management by paternalistic fatherly figures who
failed to equally support women’s power and advancement.30 The subtleties of engrained norms
failed to demonstrate to a jury that the problem was more than one woman’s promotion, but
rather about workplace expectations, daily treatment, workplace relations, and standards for
advancement all defined by Mad-Men era norms of masculinity. In another example, a woman
federal prosecutor in Washington State, the high-ranking Deputy Criminal Chief, faced an uphill
battle to prove sex discrimination by her unequal pay, isolation, and lack of authority in the
workplace based on individual intent rather than systemic male-norms of workplace

28

See infra.
CHAMMALLS & WRIGGINS, supra; MacKinnon, supra.
30
David Streitfeld, Ellen Pao Loses Silicon Valley Bias Case Against Kleiner Perkins, NY TIMES, Mar. 27, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/technology/ellen-pao-kleiner-perkins-case-decision.html?_r=0; Cassidy
Tucker, Pao ’91 Loses Discrimination Lawsuit, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Mar. 29, 2015,
http://dailyprincetonian.com/news/2015/03/pao-91-loses-discrimination-lawsuit/.
29
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management.31 Glass ceilings and workplace cultures have been resistant to the damages claims
of any one individual.
The feminist insight as to these systemic problems is the importance of power.32 The
lack of women’s power as decision makers in the workplace, politics, or science means the
perpetuation of the patriarchy (yes patriarchy) and male privilege from the top down.
Generations at the top may be outdated, but they continue to transmit the same outmoded
assumptions, reinvigorating a new generation with the same discriminatory norms and practices.
Scholars have discussed the inadequacy of existing remedies for gender discrimination in
the tort damages context. “When viewed through a wider cultural lens, the basic structure of
contemporary tort law still tends to reflect and reinforce the social marginalization of women and
racial minorities and to place a lower value on their lives, activities, and potential.”33 Nonpecuniary damages are limited for emotional, dignitary, or intangible harms. “The privileged
status of physical harm over emotional and relational injury found in contemporary tort law is
sustained by dubious assumptions about the greater seriousness and important of this type of
injury in the lives of ordinary people.”34 Legal standards of tort ask “what is reasonable” of the
objective person, incorporating men who have not experienced discrimination, the lack of
privilege, second-class status, or emotional toll, thereby rendering reactions to these
consequences automatically unreasonable. Thus, remedies fail to correct action or provide
incentives or leverage against discriminatory action. “Under the status-quo, tort law’s remedial
damage scheme both perpetuates existing racial and gender inequalities and creates ex-ante

31

Bolton v. Lynch, No. 2:15-CV-294 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2015); Kip Hill, Female Ex-Federal Prosecutor Files
Gender Discrimination Lawsuit, THE SPOKESMAN REV., Oct. 21, 2015,
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2015/oct/21/female-prosecutor-in-us-attorneys-office-in-spokan.
32
Feminist Perspectives on Power, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-power/.
33
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra.
34
Id.
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incentives for potential tortfeasers to engage in future discriminatory harm (discriminatory
targeting) towards women and minorities.”35
Elsewhere in the law, it is difficult to prove systemic gendered harm based on proof, jury
bias, and new limitations of class action cases.36 Even when systemic violations are established,
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to award relief. For example, in Manhart v. Department of
Power, the Court found systemic denial from overcharging women for their retirement plan, but
denied restitution and return of the wrongfully charged monies.37 Even though the general legal
rule was that Title VII remedies should “make the plaintiff whole.” And even though in a similar
case two years earlier, the Court did award such relief to remedy men’s unequal retirement
benefits resulting from a longer work time to retirement.38 The all-male Court was concerned
with institutional problems of defendant’s solvency and impact on third parties, even where the
defendant admitted it had sufficient existing funds to pay.39 Governments and third parties were
all weighed higher in the remedial calculus than the women who had proven discrimination.
A glimmer of remedial hope was seen in the creation of sexual harassment remedies. A
series of prophylactic injunctive remedies in the 1980s turned workplace culture from Mad Men
era to zero tolerance.40 Prophylactic provisions reaching facilitators of continued harm and
requiring institutional change were more effective than meager damages in not only shifting the
culture in defendant’s workplace, but in bringing about broader cultural shifts in norms and
acceptable behavior.41 Relief like institutional reporting and grievance structures, education of

Ronen Avraham, Is Race- and Sex-Based Targeting Efficient? A Closer Look at Tort Law’s Discriminatory
Damage Awards, available at www.ssrn.com.
36
Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___ (2011).
37
435 U.S. 702 (1978); Tracy A. Thomas, Manhart, in THE U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Cambridge Press
2016).
38
Id.; see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 455 (1976).
39
435 U.S. at 720-23.
40
Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra, at 119.
41
Id.
35
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institutional behavior, and establishment of policies made the difference. As a corollary, the
courts developed a safe harbor for corporate defendants who adopted these institutional changes,
insulating them from vicarious liability for punitive damages for the bad acts of employees. 42
The key was that courts realized that continuing to slap down individual aggressors and award
personal damages for lost income and emotional distress were severely inadequate to changing
the gendered and sexualized workplace culture. Instead, proactive, injunctive relief altering the
institutional structure and the power itself was required.

II.

Precedent for Solutions: Go Big or Go Home
The rest of the world is ahead of the U.S. on the idea of gender quotas. Quotas,

sometimes phrased as the softer, and more palatable term “targets,” have been adopted in many
European contexts over the past twenty years in order to redress discrimination and restructure
power including corporate boards, legislative bodies, and ivory towers.43 “Quotas represent a
fast-track policy measure, in contrast to the well-known incremental-track model according to
which gender equality will come in due time as a country develops. . . . [G]ender quotas are a
simple answer to a very complex problem, that of women’s historical exclusion” from political
and private systems of power.44
Gender quotas for corporate boards have received the most attention in America.45 It
began with Norway’s mandate adopted a decade ago requiring 40% women on governing boards

42

Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999).
Gender Quotas: Vital for Equality or Mere Tokens? THE WEEK, May 15, 2015,
http://www.theweek.co.uk/63678/gender-quotas-vital-for-equality-or-mere-tokenism (UK adopted “targets” not
“quotas”).
44
SUSAN FRANCESCHET, ET. AL., EDS., THE IMPACT OF GENDER QUOTAS vii (2012).
45
See, e.g., Julie C. Suk, Gender Quotas After the End of Men, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1123 (2013); Anne L. Alstott,
Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 38, 39
(2014); Deborah L Rhode & Amanda K Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does
Difference Make? 39 DELAWARE J. CORP. LAW 377, 383 (2014); Julie C Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy:
43
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of companies and enforced by penalties. Other countries including Germany, France, as well as
the European Union have adopted gender quotas for corporate boards, requiring companies to
have anywhere from 20 to 40 percent women directors.46 In the United States, the Securities and
Exchange Commission requires companies to report the percentage of board members by gender,
but nothing further.47
Quotas for gender have also been adopted in over one hundred countries for elections in
Europe, Asia, and African. These electoral quotas typically require a certain percent of political
candidates be women, ranging from 20 to 50 percent.48 The argument for electoral quotas is that
women must be “a ‘critical minority’ of 30 to 40 percent of the decision-making body to have an
influential voice and to make substantive contributions to the legislative process.”49 Advocates of
electoral quotas do not want simply to increase the number of women in office, but also
“diversify the types of women elected, raise attention to women’s issues in policy making,
change the gendered nature of the public sphere, and inspire female voters to become more
politically active.”50

From Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CON. LAW 449, 452 (2012); Larelle Chapple & Jacquelyn E
Humphrey, Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Financial Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance,
122 J. BUS. ETHICS 709, 711 (2014); Kevin Campbell & Antonio Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the
Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 435 (2008) (finding that greater gender diversity on
boards increased firm values); Valentina Zarya, New Proof That More Female Bosses Equals Higher Profits,
FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/02/08/women-leadership-profits/
46
Suk, End of Men, supra, at 1125-26 (noting European Commission rule prohibiting any sex to have more than
60% representation on corporate board); Sullivan, supra; Spender, supra, at 110-11 (describing the examples of
France, 40 percent by 2016, 20 percent as interim measure; Australia, 40 percent targets for public sector boards);
47
AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY
(2015).
48
FRANCESCHET, supra, vii, 3-5 (these include reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas); Suk, supra,
1126; Anisa A. Somani, Note, The Use of Gender Quotas in America: Are Voluntary Party Quotas the Way to Go?,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1451 (2013); Lisa Baldez, Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative
Candidates in Mexico (2004), http://www.quotaproject.org/aboutQuotas.cfm.
49
Somani, supra, at 1153, 1155 (citing the successful example of Rwanda which incorporated a gender quota into its
constitution in 2003, reserving at least 30 percent of the seats for women, and now ranks highest among all countries
for its level of female political representation in its national legislature, with women comprising 56 percent of the
lower house and 39 percent of the upper house).
50
FRANCESCHET, supra, 3.
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An increasing number of countries are also using gender quotas for scientific committees,
to assess and award academic tenure and promotion.51 “The underrepresentation of women in
academia remains a cause for concern among universities and policy makers around the world.
In Europe, women account for 46% of PhD graduates, 37% of associate professors and only a
mere 20% of full professors.”52 One contributing cause identified for this gender disparity has
been all-male evaluation panels, and thus “a number of countries have introduced quotas
requiring the presence of at least 40% of women (and men) in scientific committees.”53
A key question debated with all of these mandates is what difference, if any, the gender
quotas make. Arguments are made as to substantively different outcomes that might result. The
business case for gender-balanced corporate boards is that companies’ bottom lines, financial
performance, and shareholder profits improve when women direct.54 Other studies find that
boards are more active when they are gender-balanced, and thus provide better productivity and
CEO oversight.55 These performance conclusions are sometimes explained by gender

51

Manuel Bagues, et. al, Does the Gender Composition of Scientific Committees Matter?, July 8, 2015,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628176.
52
Id. at *2.
53
Finland introduced gender quotas in 1995 through the amendment of the Finnish Act on
Equality between Women and Men. In 1999, the European Commission stated the aim to achieve at
least a 40% representation of women in Marie Curie scholarships, advisory groups, assessment panels
and monitoring panels. In 2007, gender quotas were introduced in Spain within the Equality Law. More recently in
2014, France has also introduced quotas in all scientific committees. Id. at *4 n.5.
54
DHIR, supra (study of Norwegian quota model demonstrates the important role diversity can play in enhancing the
quality of corporate governance); Alstott, supra, at 42; Linda-Eling Lee, et al., Women on Boards: Global Trends in
Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, MSCI, Nov. 2015, https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/04b6f646d638-4878-9c61-4eb91748a82b; Spender, supra, at 106; Deborah L Rhode & Amanda K Packel, Diversity on
Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? 39 DELAWARE J. CORP. LAW 377, 383 (2014);
Julie C Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CON. LAW
449, 452 (2012); Larelle Chapple & Jacquelyn E Humphrey, Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Financial
Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 709, 711 (2014); Kevin Campbell &
Antonio Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS
435 (2008) (finding that greater gender diversity on boards increased firm values); Valentina Zarya, New Proof That
More Female Bosses Equals Higher Profits, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/02/08/womenleadership-profits/ (discussing new study concluding that companies with 30% female leaders have net profit
margins up to 6% higher); Noland & Moran, supra.
55
Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Gender and Board Activeness: The Role of a Critical Mass, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS (forthcoming); Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Gender and Board Activeness: The Role of a Critical Mass, The
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essentialist thinking that women are more risk adverse, less likely to engage in fraudulent
activity, and consensus focused.56 As Prime Minister Trudeau put it, “Let’s start rewarding
politicians and companies who aren’t driven by a macho approach.”57
In another context, researchers have worked to prove that women judges reach different
results. Some studies show more favorable decisions to plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases or
more sympathetic rulings to plaintiffs in immigration cases.58 Other studies show no measurable
substantive difference in outcome for from female judges.59 Still others argue that the full
substantive impact of women in power is not yet realized because we are nowhere near the point
of shared power of 50/50 at which women have the authority to make a meaningful difference.60
However, “while functionalist arguments dominate the literature and the debate” over
gender quotas, “the most enduring justifications are normative, and based on equality, parity and
democracy.”61 Functionalist arguments contend that women make a measurable difference to
performance, but this is not necessarily the point. The reason for requiring gender quotas is not
for any particular outcome, but for shared power and procedural legitimacy. The normative and
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“symbolic representation of women is sufficient” as a justification for quotas “because it signals
a change to traditional conceptions of authority and citizenship.”62 “Symbolic representation” is
“the concept that, when women are included in decision-making bodies and are therefore visible
in the public sphere, this signals a change to traditional conceptions of authority, citizenship and
norm creation.”63 As explained in the context of judicial gender quotas, the difference sought is
not in the result per se, but in the representation in access to power, ensuring the fairness of the
law, and more fully representing the human experience.64 Fundamental interests or norms at the
core of our constitutional and legal rights dictate insurance against systemic discriminatory
decisions by providing the shared power base.
This systemic representative ideal emerged in the 1990s in the European discourse as
“gender parity,” the representation of men and women in roughly equal numbers. It “was
understood to be a requirement of all legitimate institutions exercising power in a democracy
because each sex represented half of humanity. Thus conceived, gender balance is . . . a
permanent feature of good governance.”65 “Parity democracy,” understood as fifty-fifty malefemale representation in all organizations exercising power in a democratic society, “is not
primarily aimed at enhancing women's opportunities as individuals or even as a group. Its
primary purpose is to legitimize the larger institution's exercise of political, economic, and social
power.”66 This is a systemic understanding of power and an incorporation of the feminist goal to
have women be a part of that power structure.
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Even if functional difference could justify gender-balanced power, such outcome
difference is not likely to occur in advance of gender parity. For, it is only through symbolic
representation that functional difference even becomes possible. “When governments reflect the
actual demographics of the populations they are elected to represent, effective representation of
the diverse interests of citizens is more likely. Without women in high level government
positions, issues that are important to women are less likely to be addressed in a meaningful
way.”67 Women need to advance out of tokenism, beyond the tipping point of minority
representation to a critical mass at which such substantive difference might then be possible
(though not required).68 For tokenism, an innocuous action of requiring one women to provide
lip service to inclusion and homogeneity, offers such minimal relief as to reflect no meaningful
change.69 Indeed a recent study showed that such tokenism was affirmatively detrimental to
equality, as the inclusion of one woman or minority made it harder for any other like candidates
to be included in the power group. Despite its ineffectiveness, tokenism remains the first-step
approach to forcing systemic change, and even it is still resisted as a radical alteration of the
status quo.70 Quotas offer the potential to bypass the frozen status quo and false incrementalism
to achieve actual parity. It thus has to be all in: quotas must be 51 percent, not watered down to
20 percent like many of the first generation quotas.
Access to power is a key feminist insight, that women’s lack of power has been the
structural block to gender equity, and that gaining access to power is an ultimate remedial goal.
Women’s lack of power is the historical foundation still undergirding the law. The
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“disqualification of women as citizens in the past was a central structural feature of the modern
state, where autonomous male individuals could only thrive or continue to reproduce themselves
socially by requiring women to perform tasks in the private sphere.”71 Thus patriarchy and
coverture is a foundational structure of the American legal system with continuing
reverberations, like the legal black hole of the private sphere of domestic violence or maternity
leave, and the male privileged sphere of the workplace. Remedying this structural inequity is
core to remedying the resulting and continuing harms of unequal pay, maternity discrimination,
lack of promotion, and ineffective domestic violence enforcement. “It is only when women
actively participate in the public sphere in significantly large numbers that the system will be
forced to confront and solve the problems of dependency and social reproduction” engrained in
the public/private structure.72 It’s more than time for big change to the system of power itself.

III.

Making the Legal Case for Judicial Gender Quotas
Most of the European precedent on gender quota is legislative, not judicial. Certainly the

United States could pursue a similar legislative approach, assuming any constituencies would
undertake its advancement.73 Even if there was political support for such a move, a legislative
option encounters the same systemic barrier; results are constrained by the lack of decisional
power in legislatures where women represent only 20% of lawmakers and 29% of lobbyists.74 A
legislative solution is also often benign, because any solution that manages to achieve political
consensus is often diluted, and fails to challenge the power balance. For example, other
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countries have passed legislative gender quotas at 20, 30, and 40%, but not at a power-shifting
proportional level of the majority of 50%.75
Nor or voluntary actions sufficient to remedy the systemic problems.76 Voluntary actions
are also often mere tokenism, like the University of Texas’s recent initiative to require one
candidate for any high-level position to be one woman or minority.77 Any increase over existing
low representation of women at 15% and 20%, is more, but does not make a material shift in
power, nor is it based on a theory of proportional representation. Instead, the most successful
mechanisms of quota systems have been that like Norway’s corporate board quota, which
resembles a judicial remedy in its establishment of contempt-like enforcement penalties with
warnings and fines, escalating to dissolving company. It requires specific remedial action, rather
than simply providing abstract guarantees.
Affirmative action remedies have been a key way of opening up resistant institutions to
social change. Social justice reforms in America have been by judicial action, and are suited to
incremental change and individual context.78 They redress harm as that harm is adjudicated in
the specific context of established problems, rather than at the abstract level of policymaking.
Judicial context thus provides the opportunity to consider gender quotas. The question is
whether such quotas would be legal. The remedial law of prophylactic injunctions suggests that
it could be, and arguably without violating constitutional commands of equal protection.
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A. Quotas as Prophylaxis
The remedial precedent supports the use of quotas as legitimate prophylactic
injunctions.79 As I have discussed elsewhere, prophylactic injunctions are a particularly effective
way to provide meaningful relief for continued harm.80 Prophylaxis addresses the facilitators of
harm, the inputs that cause continued harm, providing flexibility and tailoring to solve the
problem. Because otherwise for most instances of sex discrimination, after the fact is too little
too late. Retrospective remedies allow the behavior to continue, perpetuating the discriminatory
norms in society and to new generations with only a small nuisance value. The promise of
meaningful relief is in prophylactic remedies, getting out in front of the problem and ordering the
defendant to take action to avert the problem, before it occurs again. Prophylaxis can address
contributing factors, even when that factor in and of itself, standing alone, does not violate the
law.81 Such action changes the decision-making process that otherwise allows the gendered
behaviors to happen in the first place. And carries with it the potential to shift the systemic
power dynamic itself.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the availability of structural and prophylactic
relief to response to an entrenched, systemic problem unremedied by lesser remedies.82 In
Brown v. Plata, a divided Court upheld an order to release a certain number of prisoners to
remedy the prison overcrowding that continued to systemically cause the problems with the
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State’s inability to provide adequate medical and psychiatric care to inmates.83 As Justice
Kennedy noted, the inadequate care, and deaths from such care, which continued unabated for
decades, demanded more relief when the commands to improve care failed to alter the harm.84
Thus, in situations of continued harm, courts have power to craft injunctive remedies that reach
beyond mere cessation commands to redress the systemic problems that cause the harm.85
The Supreme Court has also upheld a quota as a valid prophylactic injunctive remedy. In
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Schools, a unanimous Court upheld an order that the
racial percentage of students in each school match the racial composition of the neighbors.86 The
order thus mandated that each school be 71% white and 29% black.87 The Court explained the
quota was properly within the scope of the court’s equitable discretion given the remedial target
of the segregated school system and the total failure of any other remedy.88 The Court
appreciated that quotas were a good “starting point” for effectuating change and provided a
“reasonable, feasible, and workable” solution.89
Drawing on these precedents, the idea of a gender quota seems plausible. A gender quota
could be ordered as a judicial option in a case to alter a power system like a corporate board or
managerial employees. Understanding the system itself as contributing to the discriminatory
problem, like the overcrowded population in Plata or the segregated schools in Swann, explains
the need to target the system for a remedy. Understanding feminist theories of power – either as
gaining women access to that power resource or in ending its patriarchal domination over women
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– clarifies why the power structure is part of the causal nexus of the harm that appropriately is
included with judicial prophylaxis. Moreover, a quota, like other prophylactic measures, is
pragmatically easy. Release 30,000 prisoners or hire 50% women: the orders are finite,
objective, and capable of implementation. Or as the Court said in Swann, “feasible and
workable.” Ultimately, this is why judges like prophylaxis: it gives them a concrete remedial
option that can provide effective relief in a meaningful way.90

B. Constitutional Legitimacy
A second legal question as to the validity of gender quotas is whether ordering such
gender-specific relief would violate constitutional parameters of equal protection as seen in the
affirmative action cases.91 U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the race context seemed to have
foreclosed most affirmative action remedies like quotas in education and employment. 92
Conditioning state action based on race is said to be discriminatory and trigger strict scrutiny,
thereby justifying little state action.93 “’To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
program cannot use a quota system,’ but instead must ‘remain flexible enough to ensure that
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or
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ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.’”94 Race, however, can still be used as one
factor in decisions like university admissions.95
On the other hand, the European Court of Justice has upheld gender quotas against claims
that they violate equality dictates.96 The “ECJ's jurisprudence has reinforced the notion that
gender quotas can only be narrowly justified by the goal of eradicating women's disadvantage.
Particularly when women's underrepresentation in certain positions is explained by
prejudice, stereotype, or other practices associated with women's traditional exclusion from
working life, quotas tend to be upheld.”97 “Quotas are a mechanism for combating and undoing
the history and present complex structures of women's subordination.”98 Not all countries
agreed, as courts in France struck down gender quotas as a remedy for past sex discrimination.99
In the U.S., the question turns in large part on application of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as to whether a judicial remedy of a gender quota would
itself constitute discrimination. One key distinction between gender and race quotas is that the
constitutional standards for sex discrimination have been distinguished from those for race.100
The Supreme Court has applied only intermediate, not strict, scrutiny to sex-based
classifications.101 While arguments have been made over the years that sex is akin to race in its
immutable and stereotypical function, and thus should demand the same level of strict scrutiny,
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the Court has stuck to is different standard for women.102 As a result, the Court has shown a
greater tolerance for sex-based action, articulating a need to protect women or acknowledge
gendered differences.103 The constitutional standard has been interpreted by the Court to require
women’s admission to the avenues of power. Thus, in United States v. Virginia, the Court held
that the Virginia Military Institute must grant women equal access to the military education, not
simply provide them a separate school.104
What the intermediate standard of constitutional scrutiny might mean in the quota context
is that sex-based action might be more tolerable than race-based action.105 Perhaps this is the
silver lining of the double-standard of intermediate scrutiny. For the Court's gender
jurisprudence has recognized “the transformative potential of affirmative action” and how it
“best advances the antisubordination goal of the equal protection guarantee.”106 Courts would
need to identify important (but not compelling) interests justifying the sex-based action. These
important interests could be derived from women’s non-representative lack of power, continued
subordination, lack of autonomy, and other systemic effects well-established in the feminist
literature, and interests in equity, proportional representation, or balanced power which have
driven the other global reforms.107
This important objective of reversing gendered and discriminatory systems by mandating
shared parity of power differentiates the case of gender quotas from the women-only policy
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struck down in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.108 There, a state university’s
nursing program was open only to women.109 The state claimed that its single-sex admission
policy “compensates for discrimination against women, and therefore constitutes educational
affirmative action.”110 The Court noted, significantly, that such a justification could be an
important governmental interest. “In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened.”111 However, in Hogan, the Court found that this compensatory
remedial purpose was not in fact the state’s objective. “Mississippi has made no showing that
women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of
leadership in that field when the MUW School of Nursing opened its door, or that women
currently are deprived of such opportunities.”112 “Rather than compensate for discriminatory
barriers faced by women, MUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the School of
Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job.”113
In addition, the Court found that “MUW's admissions policy lends credibility to the old view that
women, not men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for
women a self-fulfilling prophecy.”114 Thus, the constitutional infirmity with the all-women
policy in Hogan was that it was not remedial, not aimed at reversing systemic inequality, but
rather to the contrary, impermissibly perpetuated gendered stereotypes.
Where affirmative remediation is the legitimate objective, the Supreme Court has upheld
quota-like gender preferences. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court upheld an
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affirmative action plan of a county employer granting promotion preference to a woman against
challenge under Title VII.115 The country adopted the plan because “mere prohibition of
discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects of past practices and to permit
attainment of an equitable representation of minorities, women and handicapped persons.”116 It’s
“goal” (specifically designated as the softer term “goal” rather than “quota”) was to achieve “a
statistically measurable yearly improvement in hiring, training and promotion of minorities and
women” by the use of a “benchmark by which to evaluate progress,” working toward a long-term
goal where its work force matched the gender composition of the area labor force, 36%.117 At
the time, only 22% of the employees were women, two-thirds of them clerical, only 8% women
in administration, 7% in technical, and none in the position of the skill craft worker challenged in
the lawsuit.118 The Court upheld using the gender preference as one of the factors of
employment, citing the statistical imbalance and underrepresentation of women.119 It did not, the
Court said, “unnecessarily trammel[] the rights of male employees or create[] an absolute bar to
their advancement” because positions still remained available for men (64%) and candidates,
both men and women, still had to be qualified for the position.120
Taking these cases together, the Court has shown a willingness to consider quotas in the
gender context. While it has not had the question presented directly, the Court has at least, not
closed the door to gender parity. Instead, as in any heightened constitutional scrutiny, it
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demands close and careful application of the constitutional standards to ensure that gender
preferences are not pretexts nor avenues for future discrimination.121

IV.

Conclusion
Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2016, Prime Minister Justin

Trudeau continued to advocate embracing feminism in order to effectuate change in politics and
business.122 He predicted that by looking back, we might begin to see the need for change more
clearly. “Even within our own society, if you look back 50 years or if you leaf through a
magazine from the 70s, you see horrific sexism that is overt in a way that would be unacceptable
today.”123 The same might hold true, he suggested, in the future. “Even today, hopefully 20
years from now, people will look at what we think is acceptable today and find it horrifically offbase.”124
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